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Abandon the urge to simplify everything, to look for formulas and easy answers, 12 
and begin to think multidimensionally … appreciate the fact that life is complex.  13 
 —M. Scott Peck [1] 14 
 15 
Models and experiments on adaptive decision-making typically consider highly 16 
simplified environments that bear little resemblance to the complex, heterogeneous 17 
world in which animals (including humans) have evolved. These studies reveal an array 18 
of so-called cognitive biases and puzzling features of behaviour that seem irrational in 19 
the specific situation presented to the decision-maker. Here we review an emerging 20 
body of work that highlights spatiotemporal heterogeneity and autocorrelation as key 21 
properties of most real-world environments that may help us understand why these 22 
biases evolved. Ecologically rational decision rules adapted to such environments can 23 
lead to apparently maladaptive behaviour in artificial experimental settings. We 24 
encourage researchers to consider environments with greater complexity to understand 25 
better how evolution has shaped our cognitive systems. 26 
 27 
The origins of irrational behaviour 28 
Patterns of decision-making in humans reveal some striking deviations from economically 29 
rational expectations [2–4]. These include distorted beliefs about external events [5,6], 30 
inconsistent preferences that are altered by past experience [7] and current context [8], and 31 
apparent violations of the axioms of rational choice theory [9,10]. Such deviations may be 32 
caused by cognitive biases [11] (see Glossary); here we focus on the behavioural outcomes 33 
(outcome biases [12]), since we make no assumptions about the underlying psychological or 34 
physiological mechanisms. Mounting evidence suggests that analogous biases exist in other 35 
organisms. For example, slime moulds violate regularity [13], domestic dogs show negative 36 
contrast effects [14] and honeybees behave pessimistically when agitated [15]. Far from 37 
being uniquely human quirks, our biases appear to have deep evolutionary roots. This 38 
observation seems difficult to reconcile with the fundamental biological concept of natural 39 
selection as an optimising process. Why would evolution produce such apparently irrational 40 
behaviour? 41 
One possible answer is that in many situations the costs of deviating from the optimal, 42 
fitness-maximising decision are negligible, and/or that constraints in the mechanisms 43 
underlying decision-making prevent natural selection from reaching this optimum. Studies on 44 
noisy information processing [16] and polygenic mutation–selection balance [17] have 45 
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argued for the importance of constraints. Here we summarise an emerging line of research 46 
that suggests an alternative explanation: that many surprising features of behaviour, which 47 
may at first appear irrational, can in fact be understood as the result of ecologically rational 48 
decision rules adapted to exploit environments that vary in space and time. The approach we 49 
describe is an extension of standard techniques [18] used in behavioural and evolutionary 50 
ecology to investigate the adaptive significance of animal behaviour. This approach does not 51 
assume that all behaviour is adaptive or that constraints are unimportant, but instead seeks to 52 
identify how natural selection shapes the decision rules underlying behaviour [19,20]. The 53 
implications of this work for understanding cognitive systems have been largely overlooked, 54 
because theoretical models and laboratory experiments alike have traditionally focused on 55 
highly simplified situations that fail to capture some of the important complexities of the 56 
environments in which organisms have evolved. 57 
 58 
The limitations of simple models 59 
Simple mathematical models are of great value in behavioural and evolutionary ecology, 60 
where the techniques of game theory and optimisation are used to predict the endpoints of 61 
natural selection [21]. This approach has revealed some important general principles of how 62 
organisms (including humans) should choose between different options, from food items to 63 
potential mates to the age at first reproduction. Most evolutionary models of decision-making 64 
consider a highly simplified environment in which the availability of different options is 65 
known to the organism and does not change over time. This is of course an unrealistic 66 
assumption. In most natural environments, the availability of different options fluctuates in 67 
time and space and the fluctuations are often unpredictable. 68 
That mathematical models simplify and abstract the phenomena they aim to represent is 69 
not in itself a problem; indeed, this is precisely what models are designed to do, since a 70 
model that was as complex as the real world would be of little use. But there is a danger of 71 
over-simplification [22] (‘Einstein’s razor’ [23]): if we simplify things too much, we may fail 72 
to capture crucial features of natural environments that are needed to understand the 73 
behaviour. 74 
 75 
The power of simple experiments 76 
Similarly, laboratory experiments place individuals in artificial situations that are far simpler 77 
than most situations encountered in the natural world. In many of the standard laboratory 78 
protocols routinely used in behavioural ecology and experimental psychology, subjects are 79 
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trained and tested using a small number of behavioural options, with straightforward 80 
relationships between the available stimuli, the subject’s actions and the resulting 81 
consequences [24–27]. In these artificial situations, the experimenter has created a 82 
deliberately simplified version of the types of problems the animal might encounter in its 83 
natural environment; the aim is to isolate the key variables needed to understand the 84 
behaviour. Just as with the simplified models discussed earlier, there is a risk that such 85 
laboratory settings may not reflect the statistical structure of the environment to which the 86 
animal is adapted, making it seem as though the animal is making errors [4]. However, if we 87 
recognise this problem, deviations from rational behaviour in simplified laboratory set-ups 88 
can be illuminating, as they may reveal unexpected biases that arise from rules adapted to the 89 
natural environment. 90 
 91 
Irrational behaviour from ecologically rational rules 92 
Natural selection will tend to produce decision rules which, while not optimal, perform well 93 
in the kinds of situations the individual normally encounters [19,20,28,29]; that is, they 94 
should be ecologically rational [30]. The statistical properties of environments, including the 95 
distribution of resources and how that changes over time, favour particular decision rules. For 96 
example, noisy miners (a type of bird) change their foraging strategy depending on the 97 
resource they are exploiting: they use movement-based rules when searching for 98 
invertebrates, which are cryptic and highly mobile, but switch to using spatial memory when 99 
searching for nectar, which is found only in fixed, conspicuous locations (flowers) and is 100 
quickly depleted [31]. The ecological and evolutionary context is critical; animals follow 101 
decision rules that are adapted to the statistical properties of the resource types commonly 102 
encountered during their evolutionary history. In novel experimental contexts lacking this 103 
structure, such ecologically rational rules may lead to biased or irrational behaviour. 104 
When seeking to understand how natural selection has shaped decision rules, it can be 105 
instructive to use a form of reverse engineering. This process starts with the identification of 106 
some bias that is not accounted for by current theory. The next step is to consider which 107 
particular aspects of environmental complexity need to be included in the models in order to 108 
predict that bias. The aim is to identify the minimal amount of real-world complexity that is 109 
sufficient to account for observed behaviour, forming a basis for novel predictions that can be 110 
used to test the proposed explanation. Models developed in the past few years illustrate the 111 
power of this approach and highlight spatiotemporal heterogeneity and autocorrelation as two 112 
important factors affecting the psychology of humans and other animals (Figure 1). 113 
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Incorporating these factors into standard models can explain a number of biases, listed in 114 
Table 1, that appear irrational in more simplified environments. 115 
 116 
Spatiotemporal heterogeneity 117 
Conditions in most natural environments are not uniform but vary over time and space. For 118 
highly mobile organisms, these two forms of heterogeneity will typically be closely linked; 119 
an individual moving through a spatially heterogeneous environment will encounter temporal 120 
heterogeneity too. Spatiotemporal heterogeneity has important consequences for behaviour, 121 
because in a heterogeneous world an individual’s optimal response to current conditions 122 
depends on the conditions it expects to encounter in the (near) future [32–35]. The most basic 123 
form of heterogeneity we can consider is where the conditions at any one time or place are 124 
independent of those at any other time or place (Box 1). This is only a crude representation of 125 
the heterogeneity in most natural environments (see next section), but it can already account 126 
for some interesting biases: 127 
The placebo effect. It is a widely reported (though controversial [36,37]) finding that 128 
fake treatments such as sugar pills or sham surgery, known as placebos, can lead to 129 
improvement in a patients’ health [38]. While health improvement is of course beneficial to 130 
the patient, if they are capable of recovering without help it would seem rational to do so 131 
immediately, rather than waiting for an external, inert cue. In an environment where 132 
conditions change over time, however, a delayed response may be adaptive. If an individual 133 
falls sick when conditions are harsh, it may be worth waiting until the environment is 134 
perceived to be less challenging, when it will be less costly to mount an immune response. 135 
Recent theory [39] has shown that the optimal strategy for recovery depends on the patient’s 136 
beliefs about current and future conditions, which affects the relative benefits of investing in 137 
recovery now rather than later. From this viewpoint, placebos falsely alter the patient’s 138 
expectations of the costs and benefits of putting effort into recovery, in some cases triggering 139 
an immediate response (i.e. a placebo effect). The placebo effect itself is not adaptive, but a 140 
generalised response to external cues may be favoured by natural selection if, on average, 141 
those cues reliably indicate a change in environmental conditions. 142 
Pessimism. Natural selection should, in general, produce behaviour that is appropriate 143 
for the environmental conditions, giving the impression that individuals ‘know’ what those 144 
conditions are even if they cannot perceive them directly. Sometimes, however, humans and 145 
other animals consistently behave in a way that does not maximise their short-term gains, but 146 
would maximise their short-term gains if conditions were better than they actually are (an 147 
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‘optimistic’ bias) [40,41] or worse than they actually are (a ‘pessimistic’ bias) [42–44]. 148 
Recent theoretical work [45] shows that temporal heterogeneity across generations can select 149 
for pessimism: behaviour should be biased towards the response that yields the best results in 150 
poor conditions, because it is poor conditions that have the strongest influence on long-term 151 
fitness across multiple generations. Other factors, including autocorrelation (see below), may 152 
alter the tendency towards optimism or pessimism (Box 2). 153 
 154 
Spatiotemporal autocorrelation 155 
Environments that are spatiotemporally heterogeneous may also show positive 156 
autocorrelation, in that the conditions at a given place and time tend to be similar to those at 157 
nearby locations and in the recent past (Box 1). One well-known adaptation to spatial 158 
autocorrelation is area-restricted search [46], in which successful discovery of an item 159 
prompts intensive local searching [47], thereby promoting efficient exploitation of clumped 160 
resources [48]. The impact of temporal autocorrelation is less well appreciated, but may be 161 
even more important for understanding cognitive adaptations. In environments that change 162 
over time, the strength of temporal autocorrelation—and hence the time for which current 163 
and future conditions persist—has important consequences for adaptive behaviour [49] and 164 
learning [50] and this is reflected in our cognitive systems. 165 
When there is temporal autocorrelation, current conditions not only determine the 166 
consequences of current decisions but are also informative of future conditions. This 167 
important insight can account for several well-known biases: 168 
The ‘hot hand’ fallacy. In gambling and sports, there is a widespread but often mistaken 169 
belief that players have ‘streaks’ or ‘runs’ of success. Basketball players, for example, are 170 
perceived to be more likely to shoot successfully if their previous shot hit rather than missed, 171 
whereas real data show that the chances of scoring are statistically independent from one shot 172 
to the next [51]. This so-called ‘hot hand’ belief reveals our tendency to see patterns even 173 
when none exist [52]. It has been argued that this tendency represents a broad-purpose 174 
cognitive adaptation to a world in which most resources are clumped (i.e. positively 175 
autocorrelated) in space and time [4,53,54]. Thus the hot-hand fallacy could result from a 176 
generalised decision rule that is unable to distinguish sequences of genuinely independent 177 
events from autocorrelated sequences. Experimental evidence from computer-based 178 
‘foraging’ [53] and gambling [54] tasks largely supports this view and suggests that human 179 
minds have evolved to expect temporal autocorrelation in the world. 180 
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Intransitive and irregular preferences. In an autocorrelated world, the possibility that 181 
current behavioural options will persist into the future can affect patterns of choice. Rational 182 
choice theory holds that the preference for one option over another should be both transitive 183 
and independent of irrelevant alternatives (see Glossary); satisfying the axioms of this theory 184 
is both necessary and sufficient to maximise expected benefit [55]. Studies of consumer 185 
behaviour [56] and experiments on humans [8–10] and a diverse range of other organisms 186 
[13,57–63] have found evidence for context-dependent preferences that appear to violate 187 
these axioms of rational choice (though see [64]). However, empirically observed choices are 188 
part of a long sequence of choices that individuals make throughout their lives, whereas the 189 
axioms refer to one-off choices (which can be choices between alternative decision rules that 190 
specify what to do in every possible situation an individual might encounter in its lifetime). 191 
In repeated choices, mathematical models [65,66] show that violations of transitivity and 192 
regularity can result from decision rules adapted to heterogeneous, autocorrelated 193 
environments, in which currently available options provide information about what options 194 
will be available in the future (Box 3). 195 
State-dependent valuation learning. An individual’s energetic state reflects recent 196 
foraging conditions, and can therefore inform it about future conditions in an autocorrelated 197 
world. Laboratory studies on birds [67], insects [68] and fish [69] have shown that the value 198 
animals place on different options depends on the state they were in when they learnt about 199 
those options. When given a choice between two food sources, animals consistently choose 200 
the one they previously found to be rewarding when they were hungry, despite the alternative 201 
having equal [67] or even higher [70] profitability. Evolutionary simulations [71] have shown 202 
that, although this biased valuation appears irrational, it can make sense in certain types of 203 
environments that fluctuate slowly between rich and poor conditions. If the best option 204 
differs between rich and poor conditions but individuals cannot perceive the conditions 205 
directly, state-dependent valuation learning is expected to evolve: food rewards should be 206 
more strongly reinforcing when an individual has low energy reserves, which are indicative 207 
of poor conditions. Selection favours this bias in the learning rule because making the correct 208 
choice under poor conditions is particularly important for fitness [71]. 209 
Successive contrast effects. If an individual is uncertain about the temporal pattern of 210 
change in conditions, future expectations may also be influenced by conditions experienced 211 
in the past. Standard theories of rational choice posit that optimal behaviour is path 212 
independent, in that it depends on the current state of the world but not on how that state was 213 
reached. If we equate current state with current environmental conditions, this view cannot 214 
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account for successive contrast effects, in which an individual’s response to current 215 
conditions depends on whether conditions were previously better (a negative contrast effect) 216 
or worse (a positive contrast effect) [72]. Such sensitivity to change can be understood by 217 
recognising that many animals have evolved in an environment where conditions fluctuate 218 
over time in an unpredictable way. Assuming the pattern of change is sufficiently stable, the 219 
conditions experienced in the past then provide potentially valuable information about the 220 
likely pattern of change in the future, which affects optimal behaviour (see Box 1). This 221 
dependence of optimal behaviour on past experiences can produce positive and negative 222 
contrast effects in the artificial situations used in laboratory studies [73]. Similar effects could 223 
result from an optimal trade-off between exploration and exploitation in heterogeneous, 224 
autocorrelated environments [74]. 225 
Optimism. Temporal autocorrelation across generations may also be important. If there 226 
is spatial heterogeneity in environmental conditions and those conditions persist over 227 
multiple generations (i.e. temporal autocorrelation is sufficiently high), optimistic behaviour 228 
is favoured [45] (cf. pessimism when temporal autocorrelation is weak; see previous section). 229 
Alternatively, uncertainty about an external, autocorrelated mortality risk can favour 230 
optimism [75] (Box 2). Such cognitive biases may appear irrational, but they arise from a 231 
strategy that maximises fitness over a longer timescale [76]. 232 
As these examples illustrate, some apparently maladaptive behaviours observed in 233 
artificial laboratory situations can be seen as ecologically rational if we recognise that 234 
organisms are adapted to stochastically fluctuating conditions that are autocorrelated in time 235 
and space. By interacting with this rich statistical structure, organisms have evolved to 236 
exploit their natural environments efficiently using a range of simple decision rules that need 237 
not require complex computation [77,78]. It is important to recognise that such rules may 238 
lead to outcome biases in environments that lack this statistical structure. For example, 239 
standard laboratory procedures for demonstrating successive contrast effects eliminate any 240 
correlation between past and future conditions; an ecologically rational decision rule adapted 241 
to exploit this correlation will produce apparently irrational behaviour [73]. Similarly, in tests 242 
of context-dependent choice the current options do not predict which options will be 243 
available in the future, but the animal may be responding as if they do [65,66] (see Box 3). 244 
 245 
From ‘just-so’ stories to predictions and empirical tests 246 
In the approach we have outlined, the aim is to build evolutionary models with the minimal 247 
amount of real-world complexity to account for observed patterns of decision-making. But 248 
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identifying one potential adaptive explanation does not rule out the existence of other 249 
explanations that may account for the observed bias equally well. To move beyond adaptive 250 
storytelling, models should generate testable predictions as well as explanations. In 251 
particular, evolutionary models of biases in decision-making should identify which factors 252 
affect the magnitude of the bias, and therefore the organisms and circumstances in which the 253 
bias should be most pronounced. 254 
Although the evolutionary roots of many biases appear to run deep, there is evidence of 255 
considerable variation among species. For example, studies have found evidence of 256 
successive contrast effects in honeybees, bumblebees, starlings and a variety of mammals, 257 
but not in goldfish, toads, pond turtles, chickens or pigeons [79]. This variation could reflect 258 
phylogenetic inertia [80] in the underlying neuroendocrine mechanisms that constrain 259 
behaviour [81] or ecological differences between species that select for different decision 260 
rules [82]. A general expectation of the theories we have reviewed here is that many biases 261 
will be most pronounced in species adapted to strongly fluctuating environments, where the 262 
fluctuations have a big impact on optimal behaviour. We might therefore expect some biases 263 
to be stronger in animals reliant on tightly clumped, ephemeral food sources (e.g. specialist 264 
frugivores and nectarivores) than those adapted to stable, widely available resources (e.g. 265 
grazing herbivores). To test such broad-scale, comparative predictions, we need quantitative 266 
data on variation in biases across species (controlling for selective reporting [83]) and 267 
detailed information on the spatiotemporal structure of natural environments (including social 268 
dynamics, for which ‘reality mining’ techniques [84] hold great promise). Differences in 269 
feeding ecology have been proposed to explain variation in impulsive behaviour across 270 
primates [85]; a more in-depth approach using detailed ecological data might help in 271 
understanding the taxonomic distribution of other behaviours that at first appear irrational. 272 
Another exciting possibility is to test the evolutionary predictions experimentally, by 273 
manipulating the pattern of environmental change. Taking the simplest case of two 274 
environmental states (e.g. high versus low food availability), exposing different experimental 275 
groups to different transition probabilities (see Box 1) could potentially generate different 276 
biases in decision-making, providing that the study organism can adapt behaviourally to the 277 
pattern of change. Many of the examples we have discussed involve adaptation over an 278 
evolutionary rather than behavioural timescale, but even then it might be possible to test 279 
hypotheses using experimental evolution in Drosophila, nematodes or other organisms with a 280 
short generation time. We hope researchers using these systems will take up this challenge. 281 
 282 
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Conclusion 283 
The evolutionary explanations we have highlighted here represent only one of a number of 284 
possible approaches to understanding biases in decision-making; it is important to compare 285 
this framework with alternative approaches based on genetic [17] or cognitive [16] 286 
constraints. Nonetheless, we believe that insights from evolutionary studies can make an 287 
important contribution to this issue by considering how organisms adapt to richer 288 
environments. The simple models and experiments routinely used to study decision-making 289 
may misrepresent key features of the environment of selection, leading to incorrect 290 
predictions and regular reports of seemingly irrational behaviour. The real world can be 291 
complex, variable and autocorrelated, and we should expect cognitive and perceptual systems 292 
to have evolved to exploit its statistical structure. By considering environments with 293 
sufficient richness we can generate novel, testable explanations for many puzzling 294 
behavioural and psychological phenomena, which can be meaningfully tested even in 295 
simplified laboratory settings. Much exciting work lies ahead (Box 4). A better understanding 296 
of the statistical structure of real-world environments may help us to understand the workings 297 
of the mind [86–88]. 298 
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Glossary 305 
Autocorrelation: an association across space or time in the state of the environment. Positive 306 
autocorrelation (which is our focus here) implies that environmental conditions tend to 307 
be more similar between locations and times that are close together, rather than far 308 
apart. 309 
Cognitive bias: a consistent deviation from an accurate perception or judgement of the 310 
world. Note that this is a psychological phenomenon that may or may not lead to 311 
irrational behaviour. 312 
Contrast effect: a change in the perceptual, physiological or behavioural response to a given 313 
stimulus caused by simultaneous or recent exposure to other stimuli in the same 314 
dimension. Here we consider successive contrast effects, in which the response to 315 
current conditions is enhanced by previous exposure to worse conditions (a positive 316 
contrast effect) or diminished by previous exposure to better conditions (a negative 317 
contrast effect). For example, honeybees trained to expect a 50% sucrose solution are 318 
more likely to abandon that reward source when it only delivers a 20% solution, 319 
compared to honeybees trained with a 20% solution all along [89]. 320 
Decision rule: a description (without specifying the underlying neural mechanisms) of the 321 
relationship between an internal or external stimulus and the choices an individual will 322 
make. 323 
Ecological rationality: the fit between a particular decision rule and the statistical structure 324 
of the environment in which it evolved. 325 
Environmental heterogeneity: variability in (external) environmental conditions over space 326 
(spatial heterogeneity) and/or time (temporal heterogeneity). 327 
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): a principle of rational choice stating that if 328 
an individual prefers an option A when given the choice between A and B, then it will 329 
also prefer A when given the choice between A, B and a less attractive (i.e. irrelevant) 330 
option C. 331 
Irrational behaviour: acting in a way that is not optimal. In the context of evolutionary 332 
theory, rationality—sometimes called biological rationality (B-rationality), to 333 
distinguish it from economic rationality (E-rationality) [90–92]—does not imply 334 
conscious consideration of different options, but merely behaving in a way that 335 
maximizes expected benefit. 336 
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Outcome bias: a pattern of decision-making that apparently deviates from the predictions of 337 
rational choice theory. Note that this definition makes no assumptions about 338 
underlying cognitive processes. 339 
Path independence: a principle of rational choice stating that an individual’s decisions 340 
should only depend on its knowledge about the current state of the world (including 341 
itself), not on past states. 342 
Rational choice theory: an economic theory giving an axiomatic definition of 343 
(economically) rational behaviour. 344 
Regularity: a principle of rational choice stating that the frequency with which an individual 345 
chooses option A when given a choice between A, B and C cannot be higher than the 346 
frequency of choosing A when given a choice between only A and B. 347 
Transitivity: a principle of rational choice stating that if an individual prefers option A in a 348 
choice between A and B, and option B in a choice between B and C, then it must prefer 349 
A in a choice between C and A.  350 
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Box 1. Modelling environmental heterogeneity and autocorrelation 351 
Incorporating environmental heterogeneity into models of adaptive behaviour requires the 352 
inclusion of an environmental state variable. Often we can capture sufficient complexity with 353 
just two environmental states A and B, such as high and low food availability, or safe and 354 
dangerous. Next, we characterise stochastic transitions between the environmental states. The 355 
simplest case is where the probability of transition (per unit time) between states depends 356 
only on the current state (Figure Ia), because then we can write the transition probabilities as 357 
single values cA and cB (the subscripts indicating the current state), with cA + cB < 1 358 
representing positive temporal autocorrelation. The length of time the environment stays in 359 
state i then follows a geometric distribution with mean ti = 1/ci. We assume that the 360 
individual ‘knows’ (i.e. is adapted to) these probabilities and can directly perceive the current 361 
conditions. We then investigate how environmental heterogeneity affects responses to current 362 
conditions, such as predation risk [49]. For a finer gradation of states, this approach can be 363 
extended to any number of states n, with an n × n matrix of transition probabilities. For some 364 
systems, such as gradual changes in the food supply, we set all the probabilities of moving 365 
between non-adjacent states to zero. 366 
Individuals will often be uncertain about the transition probabilities and we may be 367 
interested in how they should respond to this uncertainty. A simple representation considers 368 
two possible transition matrices (e.g. fast- or slow-changing conditions). The individual may 369 
‘know’ the transition probabilities of each matrix, but not which matrix currently applies 370 
(Figure Ib). If the environment is temporally autocorrelated, the recent past is informative of 371 
the future, so the individual should adjust its behaviour in response to its previous experience 372 
of the pattern of change. An optimal decision-maker would learn from past experience using 373 
Bayesian updating [93]. We can model this by including a state variable to represent the 374 
probability that one particular matrix applies, which can help explain apparently irrational 375 
behaviour such as contrast effects [73]. 376 
The above assumes that the individual can accurately perceive whether the 377 
environmental state is currently A or B. To explore a situation where the individual knows 378 
neither the current conditions nor the transition probabilities with certainty, we can use an 379 
additional variable to represent the probability of a given situation. However, note that 380 
learning two interdependent probabilities requires three state variables and a very fine grid 381 
size; computational limitations may constrain our approach. 382 
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We have described the simplest scenario for modelling temporal autocorrelation in a 383 
heterogeneous world. Real environments may show more complex patterns of change, but 384 
this is a mathematically convenient way to capture some of the statistical structure that could 385 
be important for understanding cognitive adaptations. 386 
 387 
 388 
Figure I. Flow diagram showing the dynamics of environmental state in a model of a 389 
heterogeneous, temporally autocorrelated world. (a) In the simplest case, there are just two 390 
environmental states (here, A and B) and a constant probability ci of a change from the 391 
current state i. (b) If the transition probabilities are uncertain, we can consider two possible 392 
situations (here, 1 and 2) representing different patterns of change between A and B; the 393 
environment may switch from situation j to the alternative situation with probability dj. The 394 
relative magnitude of ci and dj reflect our assumptions about the persistence of the two 395 
situations (e.g. habitat quality) relative to heterogeneity in current conditions (e.g. food 396 
availability). For example, a very small dj might be used if the pattern of change tends to be 397 
stable over the individual’s lifetime. More complex scenarios are possible in which d also 398 
depends on the current environmental state (A or B). 399 
  400 
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Box 2. The evolution of optimism and pessimism 401 
Consider an environment composed of a large collection of discrete patches. Individuals 402 
mature on a patch, reproduce and die. Some of their offspring disperse to other patches. 403 
Patches change over time, independently of one another; in some generations conditions are 404 
good, in other generations poor. Whether optimal behaviour appears unduly optimistic or 405 
pessimistic that conditions are good depends on the degree of dispersal and autocorrelation 406 
[45]: 407 
(a) When dispersal between patches is low, pessimism is favoured; individuals must behave 408 
conservatively in case conditions deteriorate and the whole lineage is wiped out. 409 
(b) When dispersal rates are higher, dispersal acts as an insurance against a local patch 410 
deteriorating, spreading the risk between members of the same lineage, so that 411 
individuals no longer need to be conservative. If conditions are positively autocorrelated 412 
in time there is a ‘multiplier effect’ [94], with descendant numbers growing rapidly in a 413 
patch over successive generations if conditions are good. Individuals should then take a 414 
risk and behave optimistically so as to exploit conditions if these turn out to be good, 415 
because behaviour in good conditions has a predominant influence on long-term fitness 416 
[45]. 417 
It can also be optimal to be optimistic about the chances of survival. Imagine an animal that 418 
has to survive a given period of T days if it is to reproduce. Suppose that the density of 419 
predators varied during the evolutionary history of the population, and that there are no cues 420 
that provide direct information on the density on a given day. Then the frequency with which 421 
different levels of predation occurred in the past specifies the current probability distribution 422 
of predation levels. Do we expect anti-predator traits (e.g. cautious behaviour) to evolve so 423 
that individuals maximise their expected daily survival given this distribution? It depends 424 
[75]: 425 
(a) If T = 1 or predator density on successive days is independent, then the answer is yes. 426 
(b) However, if T > 1 and predator density on successive days is positively autocorrelated, 427 
then individuals do best to be optimistic about risk. To understand this, consider the 428 
extreme case in which T is large and predator density is the same on all days, either 429 
always high or always low. If the density is high, the individual will almost certainly die 430 
regardless of its anti-predator trait, whereas if it is low the trait value matters. Thus the 431 
trait is only really relevant when the density is low, so it should evolve to be optimal 432 
given a low density [75]—that is, behaviour should appear optimistic about predation 433 
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risk. Weaker autocorrelation in the predator density across successive days will favour a 434 
weaker optimistic bias towards the optimal response for low density.  435 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
17 
 
Box 3. Violations of regularity and transitivity 436 
A central tenet of studies of decision-making is that in the absence of constraints or costs, 437 
decisions should be transitive and regular (see Glossary) in sequences of choices (cf. in one-438 
off choices, as required by rational choice theory). In an autocorrelated world, this is not 439 
necessarily true. 440 
Foragers often face a choice between options that differ in both the expected rate of 441 
energy gain and the risk of predation, which may be positively related. What is the strategy 442 
that maximises long-term survival? At high reserves, they should choose options with a low 443 
predation risk; at low reserves, to avoid starvation they should choose options with a high 444 
probability of energy gain. For intermediate reserve levels, the best option depends not only 445 
on the immediate danger but on the longer-term risk of starvation. If options persist into the 446 
future, this risk depends on which other options are currently available; options that are not 447 
currently chosen may still affect optimal decisions, because they can act as insurance against 448 
an energetic shortfall in the future. For example, a dangerous but high-gain option should be 449 
avoided when the individual is well-fed, but can be relied on in an emergency if reserves drop 450 
to critically low values. In the absence of this insurance option, the individual may be forced 451 
to choose riskier foraging options than it would do otherwise, to keep its energy reserves at a 452 
safe level. The value of a given option is therefore affected by the presence of other options, 453 
which can lead to violations of regularity [65] and transitivity [66] under optimal behaviour. 454 
Recent models predict that violations may occur even in cases without state-dependence, 455 
where the animal is simply maximising its rate of energy gain [95]. 456 
Without autocorrelation, the presence of one option would not affect the value of 457 
another. Waksberg et al. [96] argued that irregular choice could outcompete rational 458 
behaviour in a model with no autocorrelation, but they considered a restricted set of decision 459 
rules that did not allow the individual’s choice to depend on its current energy reserves [97]. 460 
This set does not include the optimal decision rule. In evolutionary models of decision-461 
making that account for heterogeneity, it is important that the best-performing decision rule is 462 
optimal over some sufficiently long timescale, otherwise we cannot argue that it would have 463 
evolved [76].  464 
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Box 4. Outstanding questions 465 
 A major theme of the recent theoretical work discussed here is that in a temporally 466 
autocorrelated world, current or past options may be informative about the future. This 467 
general principle may shed light on decisions in a range of other situations, such as choice 468 
between risky options (i.e. options for which the outcome is variable). Prospect theory is a 469 
highly influential descriptive model of human decision-making that captures several 470 
interesting features of our attitudes to risk [98], such as our tendency to focus more on 471 
changes in state (e.g. wealth) than the states themselves. Could this pattern of decision-472 
making be ecologically rational in an autocorrelated world (see Box 1)? If conditions 473 
fluctuate over time, organisms may need to take into account the pattern of change to 474 
decide whether it is worth gambling on a risky but potentially highly rewarding option. 475 
 How does natural selection shape the mechanisms involved in decision-making? Most 476 
models of adaptive decision-making focus on behaviour, ignoring the psychological and 477 
physiological mechanisms that produce it. But observed behaviour may be consistently 478 
associated with particular psychological and/or physiological states, so to understand 479 
decision-making properly we need to model the evolution of these mechanisms explicitly 480 
[19]. This can be technically challenging and typically involves computationally intensive 481 
methods such as genetic algorithms (e.g. see [99]), but modern computing power is 482 
beginning to bring these approaches within reach. 483 
 Studies of the evolution of psychological mechanisms may hold the key to unravelling 484 
some of the most enduring mysteries of the human mind, such as why we have emotions 485 
and moods. Do affective states enhance or constrain decision-making? One idea is that 486 
mood states are an efficient way of summarising recent experiences and can be used to 487 
adjust decision thresholds, which might be adaptive in a stochastically changing, 488 
autocorrelated environment [100–102] (see Box 1). Whether emotions and moods are 489 
closely linked to brain mechanisms that promote survival and other fitness components is 490 
unclear [103], but this remains a promising direction for future research. 491 
 One of the key challenges of a comparative, evolutionary approach to cognitive biases is 492 
how to identify analogous outcome biases in non-human organisms. To allow valid 493 
comparisons, behavioural measures need to be both ecologically relevant and applicable to 494 
a wide range of taxa. Tests have been devised for impulsive behaviour [104,105] and for 495 
optimistic and pessimistic biases [15,106], but what are the behavioural indicators of 496 
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affective states such as anxiety, depression or disappointment? Researchers are beginning 497 
to tackle this difficult problem [44,107,108], but much remains to be done.  498 
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Table 1. Biases that seem irrational in a simplified world 499 
Bias Description Why does it seem irrational? 
The placebo effect [5] Medicinally inert substances or fake 
treatment procedures enhance 
recovery 
Individual who is capable of recovery 
without external help should do so 
immediately 
Optimism [40] and 
pessimism [42] 
Individual behaves as though 
conditions are better (optimism) or 
worse (pessimism) than they actually 
are 
Rational decision-maker should base 
behaviour on unbiased (Bayesian) 
estimate of current conditions 
The ‘hot hand’ 
fallacy [6] 
Misinterpretation of a statistically 
independent sequence of successes as 
a run of good form 
In a sequence of trials known to be 
independent (e.g. roulette), estimated 
chance of success should not be 
influenced by outcome of previous trial 
Intransitive choice 
[63] 
Individual prefers option A over 
option B and option B over option C, 
but prefers C over A 
Inconsistent with absolute valuation of 
options, which would imply that if A > B 
and B > C then A > B > C 
Violation of 
regularity [61] 
Preference for one option over 
another is reversed by presence of a 
third option 
Inconsistent with absolute valuation of 
options, which would imply that ranking 
of two options is unaffected by alternative 
options 
State-dependent 
valuation learning 
[69] 
Individual prefers options they 
previously found to be rewarding 
when in a state of need 
Rational decision-maker should choose 
whichever option gives greatest benefit, 
irrespective of past states 
Successive contrast 
effects [72] 
Response to current conditions 
depends on whether conditions in the 
past were better or worse 
Rational decisions should depend only on 
current situation; how the decision-maker 
got there is irrelevant 
  500 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
21 
 
References 501 
1 Peck, M.S. (1993) Further Along the Road Less Travelled: Wisdom For the Journey 502 
Towards Spiritual Growth, Simon & Schuster Ltd 503 
2 Gilovich, T. et al., eds (2002) Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 504 
Judgment, Cambridge University Press 505 
3 Baron, J. (2008) Thinking and Deciding, 4th edn, Cambridge University Press 506 
4 Haselton, M.G. et al. (2009) Adaptive rationality: an evolutionary perspective on 507 
cognitive bias. Soc. Cogn. 27, 733–763 508 
5 Meissner, K. et al. (2011) The placebo effect: advances from different methodological 509 
approaches. J. Neurosci. 31, 16117–16124 510 
6 Avugos, S. et al. (2013) The “hot hand” reconsidered: a meta-analytic approach. 511 
Psychol. Sport Exerc. 14, 21–27 512 
7 Tversky, A. and Griffin, D. (1991) Endowment and contrast in judgments of well-513 
being. In Subjective Well-being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Strack, F. et al., 514 
eds), pp. 101–108, Pergamon Press 515 
8 Trueblood, J.S. et al. (2013) Not just for consumers: context effects are fundamental to 516 
decision making. Psychol. Sci. 24, 901–908 517 
9 Kalenscher, T. et al. (2010) Neural signatures of intransitive preferences. Front. Hum. 518 
Neurosci. 4, 49 519 
10 Pettibone, J.C. (2012) Testing the effect of time pressure on asymmetric dominance and 520 
compromise decoys in choice. Judg. Decis. Mak. 513–523 521 
11 Pronin, E. (2007) Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment. Trends 522 
Cogn. Sci. 11, 37–43 523 
12 Marshall, J.A.R. et al. (2013) On evolutionary explanations of cognitive biases. Trends 524 
Ecol. Evol. 28, 469–473 525 
13 Latty, T. and Beekman, M. (2011) Irrational decision-making in an amoeboid 526 
organism: transitivity and context-dependent preferences. Proc. R. Soc. B 278, 307–312 527 
14 Bentosela, M. et al. (2009) Incentive contrast in domestic dogs (Canis familiaris). J. 528 
Comp. Psychol. 123, 125–130 529 
15 Bateson, M. et al. (2011) Agitated honeybees exhibit pessimistic cognitive biases. 530 
Curr. Biol. 21, 1070–1073 531 
16 Hilbert, M. (2012) Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: how noisy information 532 
processing can bias human decision making. Psychol. Bull. 138, 211–237 533 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
22 
 
17 Keller, M.C. and Miller, G. (2006) Resolving the paradox of common, harmful, 534 
heritable mental disorders: which evolutionary genetic models work best? Behav. Brain 535 
Sci. 29, 385–404 536 
18 Houston, A.I. and McNamara, J.M. (1999) Models of Adaptive Behaviour: An 537 
Approach Based on State, Cambridge University Press 538 
19 McNamara, J.M. and Houston, A.I. (2009) Integrating function and mechanism. Trends 539 
Ecol. Evol. 24, 670–675 540 
20 Fawcett, T.W. et al. (2013) Exposing the behavioral gambit: the evolution of learning 541 
and decision rules. Behav. Ecol. 24, 2–11 542 
21 McNamara, J.M. and Weissing, F.J. (2010) Evolutionary game theory. In Social 543 
Behaviour: Genes, Ecology and Evolution (Székely, T. et al., eds), pp. 88–106, 544 
Cambridge University Press 545 
22 Evans, M.R. et al. (2013) Do simple models lead to generality in ecology? Trends Ecol. 546 
Evol. 28, 578–583 547 
23 Evans, M.R. et al. (2012) Predictive ecology: systems approaches. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 548 
B 367, 163–169 549 
24 Kagel, J.H. et al. (1995) Economic Choice Theory: an Experimental Analysis of Animal 550 
Behavior, Cambridge University Press  551 
25 Wasserman, E.A. and Zentall, T.R., eds (2006) Comparative Cognition: Experimental 552 
Explorations of Animal Intelligence, Oxford University Press 553 
26 Shettleworth, S.J. (2010) Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior (2nd edn), Oxford 554 
University Press 555 
27 Davies, N.B. et al. (2012) An Introduction to Behavioural Ecology (4th edn), Wiley-556 
Blackwell 557 
28 Todd, P.M. and Gigerenzer, G. (2007) Environments that make us smart: ecological 558 
rationality. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 16, 167–171 559 
29 Hutchinson, J.M.C. and Gigerenzer, G. (2005) Simple heuristics and rules of thumb: 560 
where psychologists and behavioural biologists might meet. Behav. Processes 69, 97–561 
124 562 
30 Todd, P.M. et al. (2012) Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World, Oxford 563 
University Press 564 
31 Sulikowski, D. and Burke, D. (2010) Movement and memory: different cognitive 565 
strategies are used to search for resources with different natural distributions. Behav. 566 
Ecol. Sociobiol. 65, 621–631 567 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
23 
 
32 McNamara, J.M. et al. (1994) Foraging routines of small birds in winter: a theoretical 568 
investigation. J. Avian Biol. 25, 287–302 569 
33 Lima, S.L. and Bednekoff, P.A. (1999) Temporal variation in danger drives 570 
antipredator behavior: the predation risk allocation hypothesis. Am. Nat. 153, 649–659 571 
34 Beauchamp, G. and Ruxton, G.D. (2011) A reassessment of the predation risk 572 
allocation hypothesis: a comment on Lima and Bednekoff. Am. Nat. 177, 143–146 573 
35 Bednekoff, P.A. and Lima, S.L. (2011) Risk allocation is a general phenomenon: a 574 
reply to Beauchamp and Ruxton. Am. Nat. 177, 147–151 575 
36 Hróbjartsson, A. and Gøtzsche, P.C. (2004) Is the placebo powerless? Update of a 576 
systematic review with 52 new randomized trials comparing placebo with no treatment. 577 
J. Intern. Med. 256, 91–100 578 
37 Wechsler, M.D. et al. (2011) Active albuterol or placebo, sham acupuncture, or no 579 
intervention in asthma. N. Engl. J. Med. 365, 119–126 580 
38 Benedetti, F. et al. (2011) How placebos change the patient’s brain. 581 
Neuropsychopharmacology 36, 339–354 582 
39 Trimmer, P.C. et al. (2013) Understanding the placebo effect from an evolutionary 583 
perspective. Evol. Hum. Behav. 34, 8–15 584 
40 Brydges, N.M. et al. (2011) Environmental enrichment induces optimistic cognitive 585 
bias in rats. Anim. Behav. 81, 169–175 586 
41 Sharot, T. et al. (2012) How dopamine enhances an optimism bias in humans. Curr. 587 
Biol. 22, 1477–1481 588 
42 Mendl, M.T. et al. (2010) Dogs showing separation-related behaviour exhibit a 589 
‘pessimistic’ cognitive bias. Curr. Biol. 20, R839–R840 590 
43 Richter, S.H. et al. (2012) A glass full of optimism: enrichment effects on cognitive 591 
bias in a rat model of depression. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 12, 527–542 592 
44 Salmeto, A.L. et al. (2011) Cognitive bias in the chick anxiety–depression model. 593 
Brain Res. 1373, 124–130 594 
45 McNamara, J.M. et al. (2011) Environmental variability can select for optimism or 595 
pessimism. Ecol. Lett. 14, 58–62 596 
46 Hills, T.T. et al. (2013) Adaptive Lévy processes and area-restricted search in human 597 
foraging. PLoS ONE 8, e60488 598 
47 Zach, R. and Falls, J.B. (1977) Influence of capturing a prey on subsequent search in 599 
the ovenbird (Aves: Parulidae). Can. J. Zool. 55, 1958–1969 600 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
24 
 
48 Krakauer, D.C. and Rodríguez-Gironés, M.A. (1995) Searching and learning in a 601 
random environment. J. Theor. Biol. 177, 417–429 602 
49 Higginson, A.D. et al. (2012) Generalized optimal risk allocation: foraging and 603 
antipredator behavior in a fluctuating environment. Am. Nat. 180, 589–603 604 
50 Aoki, K. and Feldman, M.W. (in press) Evolution of learning strategies in temporally 605 
and spatially variable environments: a review of theory. Theor. Popul. Biol. (doi: 606 
10.1016/j.tpb.2013.10.004) 607 
51 Gilovich, T. et al. (1985) The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random 608 
sequences. Cogn. Psychol. 17, 295–314 609 
52 Huber, J. et al. (2010) The hot hand belief and the gambler’s fallacy in investment 610 
decisions under risk. Theory Decis. 68, 445–462 611 
53 Wilke, A. and Barrett, H.C. (2009) The hot hand phenomenon as a cognitive adaptation 612 
to clumped resources. Evol. Hum. Behav. 30, 161–169 613 
54 Scheibehenne, B. et al. (2011) Expectations of clumpy resources influence predictions 614 
of sequential events. Evol. Hum. Behav. 32, 326–333 615 
55 von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944) Theory of Games and Economic 616 
Behavior, Princeton University Press 617 
56 Mao, W. and Oppewal, H. (2012) The attraction effect is more pronounced for 618 
consumers who rely on intuitive reasoning. Mark. Lett. 23, 339–351 619 
57 Freidin, E. and Kacelnik, A. (2011) Rational choice, context dependence, and the value 620 
of information in European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris). Science 334, 1000–1002 621 
58 Morgan, K.V. et al. (2012) Context-dependent decisions among options varying in a 622 
single dimension. Behav. Processes 89, 115–120 623 
59 Sasaki, T. and Pratt, S.C. (2011) Emergence of group rationality from irrational 624 
individuals. Behav. Ecol. 22, 276–281 625 
60 Waite, T.A. (2001) Intransitive preferences in hoarding gray jays (Perisoreus 626 
canadensis). Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 50, 116–121 627 
61 Shafir, S. et al. (2002) Context-dependent violations of rational choice in honeybees 628 
(Apis mellifera) and gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis). Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 51, 629 
180–187 630 
62 Bateson, M. et al. (2002) Irrational choices in hummingbird foraging behaviour. Anim. 631 
Behav. 63, 587–596 632 
63 Shafir, S. (1994) Intransitivity of preferences in honey bees: support for ‘comparative’ 633 
evaluation of foraging options. Anim. Behav. 48, 55–67 634 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
25 
 
64 Monteiro, T. et al. (2013) Starlings uphold principles of economic rationality for delay 635 
and probability of reward. Proc. R. Soc. B 280, 20122386 636 
65 Trimmer, P. (2013) Optimal behaviour can violate the principle of regularity. Proc. R. 637 
Soc. B 280, 20130858 638 
66 Houston, A.I. et al. (2007) Violations of transitivity under fitness maximization. Biol. 639 
Lett. 3, 365–367 640 
67 Marsh, B. et al. (2004) Energetic state during learning affects foraging choices in 641 
starlings. Behav. Ecol. 15, 396–399 642 
68 Pompilio, L. et al. (2006) State-dependent learned valuation drives choice in an 643 
invertebrate. Science 311, 1613–1615 644 
69 Aw, J. et al. (2009) State-dependent valuation learning in fish: banded tetras prefer 645 
stimuli associated with greater past deprivation. Behav. Processes 81, 333–336 646 
70 Pompilio, L. and Kacelnik, A. (2005) State-dependent learning and suboptimal choice: 647 
when starlings prefer long over short delays to food. Anim. Behav. 70, 571–578 648 
71 McNamara, J.M. et al. (2012) The ecological rationality of state-dependent valuation. 649 
Psychol. Rev. 119, 114–119 650 
72 Mitchell, E.N. et al. (2012) Evaluation of an operant successive negative contrast task 651 
as a method to study affective state in rodents. Behav. Brain Res. 234, 155–160 652 
73 McNamara J.M. et al. (2013) An adaptive response to uncertainty generates positive 653 
and negative contrast effects. Science 340, 1084–1086 654 
74 Freidin, E. et al. (2009) Successive negative contrast in a bird: starlings’ behaviour 655 
after unpredictable negative changes in food quality. Anim. Behav. 77, 857–865 656 
75 McNamara, J.M. et al. (2012) It is optimal to be optimistic about survival. Biol. Lett. 8, 657 
516–519 658 
76 Houston, A.I. et al. (2012) Is optimism optimal? Functional causes of apparent 659 
behavioural biases. Behav. Processes 89, 172–178 660 
77 Hutto, D.D. (2013) Psychology unified: from folk psychology to radical enactivism. 661 
Rev. Gen. Psychol. 17, 147–178 662 
78 Barrett, L. (2011) Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and 663 
Human Minds, Princeton University Press 664 
79 Papini, M.R. (2009) Role of opioid receptors in incentive contrast. Int. J. Comp. 665 
Psychol. 22, 170–187 666 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
26 
 
80 Hansen, T.F. and Orzack, S.H. (2005) Assessing current adaptation and phylogenetic 667 
inertia as explanations of trait evolution: the need for controlled comparisons. Evolution 668 
59, 2063–2072 669 
81 Papini, M.R. (2003) Comparative psychology of surprising nonreward. Brain Behav. 670 
Evol. 62, 83–95 671 
82 Townsend-Mehler, J.M and Dyer, F.C. (2012) An integrated look at decision-making in 672 
bees as they abandon a depleted food source. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 66, 275–286 673 
83 Pautasso, M. (2010) Worsening file-drawer problem in the abstracts of natural, medical 674 
and social science databases. Scientometrics 85, 193–202 675 
84 Krause, J. et al. (2013) Reality mining of animal social systems. Trends Ecol. Evol. 28, 676 
541–551 677 
85 Stevens, J.R. and Stephens, D.W. (2009) The adaptive nature of impulsivity. In 678 
Impulsivity: The Behavioral and Neurological Science of Discounting (Madden, G.J. 679 
and Bickel, W.K., eds), pp. 361–387, APA Press 680 
86 Anderson, J.R. (1991) Is human cognition adaptive? Behav. Brain Sci. 14, 471–485 681 
87 Shepard, R.N. (2001) Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world. 682 
Behav. Brain Sci. 24, 581–601 683 
88 Todd, P.M. and Gigerenzer, G. (2001) Shepard’s mirrors or Simon’s scissors? Behav. 684 
Brain Sci. 24, 704–705 685 
89 Couvillon, P.A. and Bitterman, M.E. (1984) The overlearning–extinction effect and 686 
successive negative contrast in honeybees (Apis mellifera). J. Comp. Psychol. 98, 100–687 
109 688 
90 Kacelnik, A. (2006) Meanings of rationality. In Rational Animals? (Hurley, S. and 689 
Nudds, M., eds), pp. 87–106, Oxford University Press 690 
91 Houston, A.I. et al. (2007) Do we expect natural selection to produce rational 691 
behaviour? Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 362, 1531–1543 692 
92 Bateson, M. (2010) Rational choice behavior: definitions and evidence. In 693 
Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior, vol. 3 (Breed, M.D. and Moore, J., eds), pp. 13–19, 694 
Academic Press 695 
93 Trimmer, P.C. et al. (2011) Decision-making under uncertainty: biases and Bayesians. 696 
Anim. Cogn. 14, 465–476 697 
94 McNamara, J.M. and Dall, S.R.X. (2011) The evolution of unconditional strategies via 698 
the ‘multiplier effect’. Ecol. Lett. 14, 237–243 699 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
27 
 
95 McNamara, J.M. et al. (in press). Natural selection can favour ‘irrational’ behaviour. 700 
Biol. Lett. 701 
96 Waksberg, A.J. et al. (2009) Can irrational behaviour maximise fitness? Behav. Ecol. 702 
Sociobiol. 63, 461–471 703 
97 Houston, A.I. (2012) Natural selection and rational decisions. In Evolution and 704 
Rationality: Decisions, Cooperation and Strategic Behaviour (Okasha, S. and Binmore, 705 
K., eds), pp. 50–66, Cambridge University Press 706 
98 Wakker, P.P. (2010) Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity, Cambridge University 707 
Press 708 
99 Giske, J. et al. (2013) Effects of the emotion system on adaptive behavior. Am. Nat. 709 
182, 689–703 710 
100 Mendl, M. et al. (2010) An integrative and functional framework for the study of 711 
animal emotion and mood. Proc. R. Soc. B 277, 2895–2904 712 
101 Nettle, D. and Bateson, M. (2012) The evolutionary origins of mood and its disorders. 713 
Curr. Biol. 22, R712–R721 714 
102 Trimmer, P.C. et al. (2013) On the evolution and optimality of mood states. Behav. Sci. 715 
3, 501–521 716 
103 LeDoux, J. (2012) Rethinking the emotional brain. Neuron 73, 653–676 717 
104 Stevens, J.R. et al. (2005) The ecology and evolution of patience in two New World 718 
monkeys. Biol. Lett. 1, 223–226 719 
105 Rosati, A.G. et al. (2007) The evolutionary origins of human patience: temporal 720 
preferences in chimpanzees, bonobos, and human adults. Curr. Biol. 17, 1663–1668 721 
106 Harding, E.J. et al. (2004) Cognitive bias and affective state. Nature 427, 312 722 
107 Brilot, B.O. et al. (2009) Can we use starlings’ aversion to eyespots as the basis for a 723 
novel ‘cognitive bias’ task? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 118, 182–190 724 
108 Paul, E.S. et al. (2005) Measuring emotional processes in animals: the utility of a 725 
cognitive approach. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 29, 469–491 726 
  727 
The MAD group • The evolution of decision rules in complex environments 
28 
 
Figure 1. Incorporating spatiotemporal heterogeneity and autocorrelation into standard 728 
evolutionary models can account for a number of cognitive biases and puzzling features of 729 
behaviour. The Venn diagram indicates which combination of factors can produce particular 730 
outcomes, with the phenomena discussed in this paper shown in bold type. In a 731 
heterogeneous world the environmental conditions change over time or space (e.g. between 732 
states A and B), with positive autocorrelation implying that conditions are more likely to stay 733 
the same (thicker arrows) than change (see also Box 1). Some of the adaptive explanations 734 
we discuss are extensions of standard state-dependent models of behaviour [18] (shown in 735 
plain font). Some are based on uncertainty about current conditions and/or the pattern of 736 
environmental change [93]. Possible directions for future work are shown in italics. 737 
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